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A propositional logic of explicit proofs, LP, was introduced in [2], completing a project begun long
ago by Go¨del, [12]. LP can be looked at more generally as a logic of explicit evidence, something
currently being investigated. The Realization Theorem for LP says that any theorem of S4 can be
converted into a theorem of LP by some replacement of necessitation symbols with explicit proof
terms. Thus  of S4 is a kind of implicit existential quantiﬁer: there exists a proof term (explicit
evidence) such that. . . . Here, quantiﬁcation over evidence is added to LP, and it is shown that the
connection between S4 necessitation and the existential quantiﬁer is direct. The extension of LP
with quantiﬁers is called QLP. A semantics and an axiom system for QLP are given, soundness and
completeness are established, and several results are proved relating QLP to LP and to S4.
Keywords: logic of knowledge, modal logic, Kripke semantics, LP
1 Introduction
There is a long history of using modal logic to investigate provability in arith-
metic, going back to Go¨del. His published ideas in [11] about making  corre-
spond to provablity in Peano arithmetic eventually led to the modal logic GL,
[4,16,5]. But Go¨del also made a lesser-known proposal for the development of
a logic of explicit proofs, as part of a general program to provide a foundation
for arithmetic. This was not published in his lifetime, and was essentially
unknown until it appeared in [12]. The idea of a logic of explicit proofs was
independently found and successfully carried through to completion by Arte-
mov, [1,2]. The resulting logic is called LP, for ‘logic of proofs.’ Instead of a
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single modal operator, as in GL, it has inﬁnitely many proof polynomials, with
natural operations on them. There is an arithmetic completeness theorem for
LP, relating it to formal arithmetic. There is also a natural relationship with
the modal logic S4. One can think of LP as providing a ﬁne-grain analysis of
S4 validities.
There is also a long history of modal logics of knowledge, going back to [13],
with [6] providing the (relatively) current state of things. This has had much
success, but also some problems, most notably that of logical omniscience—in
modal logics of knowledge we tend to know too much. One plausible way of
minimizing such problems is to move from known to known for a reason. Then
one might know the consequences of what one knows, but for more complex
reasons, and this complexity of reasons provides machinery that might be
used to circumscribe an agent’s actual knowledge. Of course, mathematical
proofs serve as explicit reasons for some of the things we know. Thus diﬀerent
research areas come together: use the ideas of LP as the basis of a logic of
knowledge with explicit evidence. This was explored to some extent in [8].
The arithmetic semantics for LP is fundamental if one is interested in it
strictly as a logic of proofs, but other semantics have also been created. There
is a Kripke-style semantics in [9], which makes use of ideas from a simpler
semantics in [14]. One feature of the Kripke-style semantics for LP is that it
makes connections with an S4 logic of knowledge seem tantalizingly close.
One important result about LP is the realization theorem, which connects
the logic with S4. It says that, if one takes a theorem of S4, there is some way
of replacing all occurrences of the  operator with proof polynomials that will
result in a theorem of LP (and conversely, though this is the easy direction).
The original proof of this is in [2], and is proof-theoretic, making use of a cut-
elimination result for a sequent calculus version of LP. Alternatively, there
is a semantic proof in [9]. Indeed, semantical (non-constructive) proofs of
cut elimination can also be given, [15,9]. A full statement of the realization
theorem is more nuanced, involving positive and negative occurrences of ,
and other things, but the details can be skipped here.
The realization theorem involves quantiﬁcation ‘from the outside;’ one
thinks of the  operator as a kind of quantiﬁer, there is a proof of. It is
reasonable to try and bring this quantiﬁcation inside. In [17] such a project is
carried out, and connections with arithmetic are investigated. Unfortunately,
it is shown that this results in a non-axiomatizable logic. But one can come at
the problem from another direction. Suppose we simply begin with axiomat-
ically formulated LP, add the usual axiomatic machinery for quantiﬁcation,
and perhaps a little more as it seems appropriate. Then we ﬁnd a natu-
ral Kripke-style semantics to correspond to this, even if the connection with
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arithmetic is broken. We can think of what we are doing as part of the project
to investigate the logic of explicit reasons, which presumably is broader than
that of explicit proofs. Carrying out the approach just outlined constitutes
the present paper.
The axiomatization given is rather obvious except for one item, a uniform
Barcan formula, whose exact provenance is still unclear. In the corresponding
Kripke semantics, quantiﬁcation is over domains of things I call “reasons,” and
the proof polynomials of LP denote reasons in the same sense that terms of
ﬁrst-order classical logic denote objects in classical domains of quantiﬁcation.
The resulting logic is called QLP. Soundness and completeness results are
shown. It is shown that S4 embeds in QLP in the expected way, translating 
by an explicit existential quantiﬁer, “there exists a proof of.” It is also shown
that QLP is a conservative extension of LP—the propositional part of QLP is
exactly LP.
Finally the semantics introduced for QLP, if scaled back to LP, still oﬀers
some new features. The semantics of both [14] and [9] are quite syntactic in
nature. Proof polynomials themselves are part of the machinery. This has
been treated more abstractly in the present paper. Each QLP model has a
domain of reasons, with operations on them, and separately there is a mapping
from proof polynomials to this domain.
This paper is a continuation of [10]. I would like to thank Evan Goris for
helpful comments on that earlier version.
2 Syntax
Since QLP extends LP, I’ll begin with LP. Following [2], the collection of
formulas of LP is built up from an inﬁnite list of propositional letters and ⊥,
using ⊃, and the following additional formation rule. If X is a formula and
t is a proof polynomial, then t:X is a formula; it can be read “t is a proof
of X,” or “t is a reason for X,” or “t is evidence for X.” The collection of
proof polynomials of LP is built up from an inﬁnite list of proof variables
(typically x, y, x1, x2, . . . ) and proof constants (typically c, d, c1, c2, . . . ),
using the rules: if t and u are proof polynomials, so are t · u, t + u, and !t.
Proof constants are meant to be justiﬁcations for obvious facts, such as logical
axioms, which are not further analyzed. Proof variables are, well, variables.
As for the operation symbols, the intuition is as follows. t · u is meant to be
the result of joining together the two reasons t and u; typically if t justiﬁes
X ⊃ Y and u justiﬁes X then t · u justiﬁes Y . t + u is a kind of union or
choice operation; it justiﬁes what either t or u justiﬁes. And ! is a veriﬁcation
operator; !t veriﬁes the correctness of an application of t. It is often called a
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proof checker operation. The axioms in the next section reﬂect all this directly.
The language of LP will be referred to as LLP.
The formation rules for QLP extend those of LP, as follows. First, quan-
tiﬁcation is added: if ϕ is a formula and x is a proof variable, then (∀x)ϕ
is a formula. The usual deﬁnitions covering free and bound occurrences are
assumed. I will use the common convention of writing ϕ(x) to indicate a for-
mula with some (possibly no) free occurrences of the variable x, and ϕ(t) to
be the result of replacing all free occurrences of x with occurrences of t. And
there is one more operation on proof polynomials: if t is a proof polynomial
and x is a proof variable, then (t ∀x) is a proof polynomial. The occurrence of
x in (t ∀ x) is considered bound. The intention is that (t ∀ x) should serve as a
justiﬁcation of (∀x)ϕ(x) if t serves as a uniform justiﬁcation of each instance
of ϕ(x).
The language of QLP will be referred to as LQLP. Other propositional
connectives and the existential quantiﬁer are deﬁned symbols, as usual.
As noted, constant symbols are intended to be justiﬁcations of ‘the obvi-
ous.’ A constant speciﬁcation is a mapping C from proof constants to sets of
formulas (possibly empty)—think of it as mapping a proof constant to the set
of formulas it justiﬁes. A formula X has a proof constant with respect to C if
X ∈ C(c) for some proof constant c. A proof constant c is for a formula X if
X ∈ C(c).
3 An Axiom System
I begin with the LP axiom schemes, taken from [2].
(i) A ﬁnite set of classical axiom schemas, suﬃcient for tautologies.
(ii) t:(X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (s:X ⊃ (t·s):Y )
(iii) t:X ⊃ X
(iv) t:X ⊃ !t:(t:X)
(v) s:X ⊃ (s+t):X and t:X ⊃ (s+t):X
To these are added two standard universal quantiﬁcation axioms.
(vi) (∀x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(t), for any proof polynomial t that is free for x in ϕ(x).
(vii) (∀x)(ψ ⊃ ϕ(x)) ⊃ (ψ ⊃ (∀x)ϕ(x)), where x does not occur free in ψ.
And ﬁnally, what I call the uniform Barcan formula. More will be said about
this in Section 9.
(viii) (∀x)t:ϕ(x) ⊃ (t ∀ x):(∀x)ϕ(x), where x does not occur free in t.
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There are three rules of inference. The ﬁrst two come from LP. For starters,
there is modus ponens.
X,X ⊃ Y
Y
Following the terminology of [9], a constant speciﬁcation C is axiomatically
appropriate if C provides proof constants for exactly the axioms listed above.
The next rule depends on the choice of C, which is assumed to be axiomatically
appropriate. Call it the C necessitation rule: if X is an axiom and X ∈ C(c),
one may conclude the following.
c:X
Finally there is the standard universal generalization rule.
ϕ(x)
(∀x)ϕ(x)
I’ll refer to the system axiomatized above as QLP with constant speciﬁcation
C, where C is the constant speciﬁcation used in the necessitation rule. As usual,
Z is a theorem if it is the last line of a proof.
In [2] an internalization result (Lifting Lemma) is shown for LP. That
carries over rather easily to QLP, and plays an important role later on. Here
is the version needed, though something a bit more general could be shown,
involving derivation from premises.
Proposition 3.1 If X is a theorem of QLP, using axiomatically appropri-
ate constant speciﬁcation C, then for some proof polynomial p, with no free
variables, the formula p:X is also a theorem.
Proof. The argument is by induction on proof length. Much of it is the same
as the proof for LP, for which I refer you to [2]. The only new item is the rule
of universal generalization.
Suppose the universal generalization rule has been used to conclude (∀x)ϕ(x)
from ϕ(x), and the result is known for ϕ(x), that is, there is a proof polynomial
p with no free variables such that p:ϕ(x) is provable. Now proceed as follows.
From p:ϕ(x), conclude (∀x)(p:ϕ(x)), using the universal generalization rule.
Then by the uniform Barcan formula, axiom viii, and modus ponens, conclude
(p ∀ x):(∀x)ϕ(x). Note that since x is bound in (p ∀ x), we again have a proof
polynomial with no free variables. 
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4 Semantics
The semantics for QLP is the LP semantics of [9] with ﬁrst-order machinery
added, and that semantics in turn is a combination of Kripke modal seman-
tics and an earlier LP semantics of [14]. See [8] for additional background and
motivation. A Kripke S4 structure is used to capture a version of knowledge.
Associated with each state of the model is a collection of reasons. There are
various ways of combining reasons. In addition there is a speciﬁcation, called
an evidence function, saying which formulas a reason might serve to justify,
at which states of the Kripke structure. After all, the Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy is not ever going to justify the fact that my cat is timid. The
Encyclopedia provides reasons for many things, but is not relevant for this
item. Evidence functions are meant to capture this intuitive notion of rele-
vance. Finally, a formula is known, at a state, for a particular reason if the
formula is known in the Hintikka sense—it is true at all accessible states—and
the reason is a relevant one.
There are some notable additions to the LP semantics of [9]. Each state of
the model has an abstract domain of reasons associated with it; in the earlier
paper this was much more concrete—sets of proof polynomials were used. In
addition, of course, there is machinery to deal with quantiﬁers, which will be
discussed below.
The remainder of this section is given over to the deﬁnition of the seman-
tics.
A frame is a structure 〈G,R〉 where R is a binary relation on the non-
empty set G. Members of G are referred to as states or worlds, as usual. It
will be assumed that R is reﬂexive and transitive, that is, the frame is one for
S4.
A domain function on a frame 〈G,R〉 is a mapping D from members of G to
non-empty sets, whose members are called reasons. It is assumed that domain
functions are monotonic, that is, for Γ,∆ ∈ G, ΓR∆ implies D(Γ) ⊆ D(∆).
This amounts to saying that reasons are not tenuous—they remain even as
knowledge increases. Given a frame 〈G,R〉 and a domain function D on it, D
is the frame domain, and is deﬁned to be ∪Γ∈GD(Γ). If D(Γ) is the same for
every Γ ∈ G, the domain function is constant domain.
Given a frame 〈G,R〉 and a domain function D on it, an interpretation I is
a mapping meeting the following conditions. I assigns to each proof constant
c a member cI of D. I assigns to the one-place function symbol ! a mapping
!I : D → D. I assigns to the two-place function symbol · a binary operation
·I : D ×D → D, and to + a binary operation +I : D ×D → D. And ﬁnally,
I assigns to ∀ a mapping ∀I : D × V → D, where V is the set of variables
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of LQLP. Alternatively, one might think of ∀I as a family of maps from D to
itself, parameterized by variables. It will be assumed that, for each Γ ∈ G,
D(Γ) contains cI for every proof constant c, and is closed under sI for every
function and operation symbol s.
Suppose there is a structure 〈G,R,D, I〉 where 〈G,R〉 is a frame, D is a
domain function, and I is an interpretation. A valuation v is a mapping from
proof variables to members of D. Unlike the situation for constant symbols,
it is not required that v(x) be in D(Γ) for every Γ ∈ G. As usual, a valuation
w is an x-variant of a valuation v if v and w agree on all variables except
possibly for x. Given a valuation v, with respect to 〈G,R,D, I〉 every proof
polynomial t is mapped to a member tv of D by the following rules.
(i) xv = v(x) for x a variable
(ii) cv = cI for c a constant symbol
(iii) (t · u)v = (tv ·I uv)
(iv) (t + u)v = (tv +I uv)
(v) (!t)v =!I(tv)
(vi) (t ∀ x)v = (tv ∀I x)
Because of our assumptions on I, for a proof polynomial t it is the case that
tv ∈ D(Γ) provided v(x) ∈ D(Γ) for every proof variable x that occurs in t.
An evidence function E is a mapping that assigns to each Γ ∈ G, to each
r ∈ D, and to each valuation v a set E(Γ, r, v) of formulas of LQLP. Think of
the members of E(Γ, r, v) as the formulas that r provides possible justiﬁcation
for, in state Γ, under circumstances v. There is further discussion to be found
in [8,9] for a variant of the present notion having a more concrete version of
reasons.
There are special conditions that are imposed on evidence functions, as
follows. For all formulas X and Y , for all states Γ,∆ ∈ G, for all reasons r
and s in D, and for all valuations v:
(i) If r /∈ D(Γ) then E(Γ, r, v) = ∅.
(ii) ΓR∆ implies E(Γ, r, v) ⊆ E(∆, r, v) (evidence is also monotonic).
(iii) (X ⊃ Y ) ∈ E(Γ, r, v) and X ∈ E(Γ, s, v) implies Y ∈ E(Γ, (r ·I s), v)
(application).
(iv) If X ∈ E(Γ, r, v) and t is any proof polynomial such that tv = r, then
t:X ∈ E(Γ, !I(r), v) (proof checker).
(v) E(Γ, r, v) ∪ E(Γ, s, v) ⊆ E(Γ, (r +I s), v) (choice).
(vi) If X ∈ E(Γ, r, w) for every w that is an x-variant of v with w(x) ∈ D(Γ),
then (∀x)X ∈ E(Γ, (r ∀I x), v).
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(vii) If v and w agree on the free variables of X, then X ∈ E(Γ, r, v) iﬀ
X ∈ E(Γ, r, w).
Condition i says that unavailable evidence explains nothing. Conditions ii–v
are modiﬁed from [9], deriving ultimately from [14]. The important new item
is condition vi, which says that if r is a uniform reason for every instance of
X being true at state Γ, then there is a reason to take (∀x)X as true at Γ,
namely (r ∀I x).
A quasi-model is a structure M = 〈G,R,D, I, E ,V〉 where: 〈G,R〉 is a
frame; D is a domain function, I is an interpretation, E is an evidence function,
all as above, and V is a mapping of propositional letters to sets of states.
Truth at worlds of quasi-model M = 〈G,R,D, I, E ,V〉, with respect to a
valuation v, is evaluated in a way that extends that of [9]. The idea behind
clause v below is that X is known with t as justiﬁcation at state Γ if X is
known at Γ (true at all accessible states), and t serves as evidence for X at Γ.
(i) M,Γ v P ⇐⇒ Γ ∈ V(P ) for P a propositional letter;
(ii) M,Γ v ⊥;
(iii) M,Γ v X ⊃ Y ⇐⇒M,Γ v X or M,Γ v Y ;
(iv) M,Γ v (∀x)ϕ ⇐⇒M,Γ w ϕ for every valuation w that is an x-variant
of v and is such that w(x) ∈ D(Γ).
(v) M,Γ v (t:X) ⇐⇒ X ∈ E(Γ, t
v, v) and M,∆ v X for every ∆ ∈ G
such that ΓR∆.
A proof polynomial or formula is meaningful at state Γ of M with respect
to v provided, for every proof polynomial t that occurs in it, tv ∈ D(Γ)—
equivalently, for each variable x that has a free occurrence in the proof poly-
nomial or formula, v(x) ∈ D(Γ). Note that if t is not meaningful at Γ with
respect to v, M,Γ v t:X, by condition v because X /∈ E(Γ, t
v, v) = ∅, using
condition i on evidence functions. I’ll say X is true at state Γ with respect
to v if M,Γ v X, and otherwise X is false at Γ. Finally, X is valid in the
structure M if, for every valuation v, X is true at all states Γ of M at which
X is meaningful with respect to v.
A quasi-model M = 〈G,R,D, I, E ,V〉 meets constant speciﬁcation C pro-
vided that, for each constant c, each valuation v, and each Γ ∈ G it is the case
that C(c) ⊆ E(Γ, cI , v).
A quasi-model is a weak QLP model if all instances of axiom viii are valid
in it.
A quasi-model meets the fully explanatory condition provided that, when-
ever X is meaningful at state Γ with respect to a valuation v, andM,∆ v X
for every ∆ ∈ G such that ΓR∆, then X ∈ E(Γ, r, v), for some r ∈ D(Γ).
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A quasi-model that meets the fully explanatory condition is called strong.
The same terminology is used for models—a weak model that meets the fully
explanatory condition is a strong QLP model.
In Sections 5 and 6 the soundness and completeness result stated below is
proved. In subsequent sections the semantics will be used to establish various
properties of QLP.
Theorem 4.1 Let C be a constant speciﬁcation that is axiomatically appro-
priate. A formula X of LQLP has an axiomatic proof using speciﬁcation C if
and only if X is valid in all weak QLP models that meet speciﬁcation C if and
only if X is valid in all strong QLP models that meet speciﬁcation C.
5 Soundness
QLP is sound with respect to the weak model semantics, and hence also with
respect to the strong model semantics.
Theorem 5.1 Let C be an axiomatically appropriate constant speciﬁcation.
If X has a QLP proof using the C necessitation rule then X is valid in all weak
QLP models that meet speciﬁcation C.
This theorem is shown by induction on the length of the proof of X. It
has no essential diﬃculties, and will appear in the full version of the paper.
6 Completeness
QLP is complete with respect to the strong model semantics, and hence also
with respect to the weak model semantics.
Theorem 6.1 Let C be a constant speciﬁcation that is axiomatically appro-
priate. If a formula X of LQLP is valid in all strong QLP models that meet
speciﬁcation C, then X has an axiomatic proof using C.
The proof of this, which is rather lengthy, will be in the full version of the
paper.
7 Relationship With S4
Following Go¨del, [11], one might think of the operator of S4 as corresponding
to the existence of a proof in some sense. Artemov made this precise, [2],
showing an embedding result between S4 and LP, under which  occurrences
are replaced with explicit proof terms. In QLP one can say a proof, or reason,
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exists, so one should expect that S4 embeds into QLP by turning  into an
existential quantiﬁer. This is the case, and will be shown in this section.
Let LS4 be the language built up from the same propositional letters as
LQLP, using ⊃ and ⊥, without proof terms or quantiﬁers, but with the addi-
tional formation rule: if X is a formula, so is X. That is, LS4 is a standard
propositional modal language, whose propositional letters are the same as in
LQLP. Now I deﬁne an embedding from LS4 into LQLP, mapping formula X to
formula X∃, as follows.
(i) If P is a propositional letter, P ∃ = P
(ii) ⊥∃ = ⊥
(iii) (X ⊃ Y )∃ = (X∃ ⊃ Y ∃)
(iv) (X)∃ = (∃x)x:(X∃)
In the last clause above, the actual choice of variable is not important—I’ve
standardized on x. Note that for every X of LS4, X∃ is a closed formula of
LQLP.
Theorem 7.1 For each formula X of LS4, X is a theorem of S4 if and only
if X∃ is a theorem of QLP.
The proof of this makes use of both LS4 and QLP semantics. It will appear
in the full version of the paper.
8 Relationship With LP
Obviously QLP is an extension of LP. It would be disconcerting if adding quan-
tiﬁcational machinery had an eﬀect on the propositional part. Fortunately,
QLP is a conservative extension of the propositional logic LP.
Proposition 8.1 Let X be a formula in the language LLP—equivalently, X
is a quantiﬁer-free formula of LQLP. If X is not a theorem of LP, then X is
not a theorem of QLP.
The proof of this makes use of the LP semantics of [9] and the QLP seman-
tics. It will appear in the full version of the paper.
9 The Uniform Barcan Formula
Axiom viii is a signiﬁcant addition to LP, and needs some discussion. Recall
from Section 4, what turns a quasi-model into a model is the validity of the
Uniform Barcan Formula. This was stated as a validity requirement and not as
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a structural condition because I don’t know how to do that. Validity is implied
by a quasi-model being constant domain, but probably is not equivalent to it.
Proposition 9.1 Let M = 〈G,R,D, I, E ,V〉 be a quasi-model that is con-
stant domain. Then it is a weak QLP model—all instances of axiom viii are
valid in it.
Proof. In a quasi-model the evidence function must meet all the conditions
given in Section 4, in particular condition vi: If X ∈ E(Γ, r, w) for every w
that is an x-variant of v with w(x) ∈ D(Γ), then (∀x)X ∈ E(Γ, (r ∀I x), v).
Now suppose M is a constant domain quasi-model, I’ll show all instances
of axiom viii are valid in it. So, consider (∀x)t :ϕ(x) ⊃ (t ∀ x) : (∀x)ϕ(x),
where x does not occur free in t, and suppose M,Γ v (∀x)t : ϕ(x), but
M,Γ v (t ∀ x):(∀x)ϕ(x). By the ﬁrst, M,Γ w t:ϕ(x) for every x-variant w
of v (the condition that w(x) ∈ D(Γ) can be omitted since we have constant
domains). It follows that ϕ(x) ∈ E(Γ, tw, w) for every x-variant w of v, but
since x does not occur free in t, this is the same as ϕ(x) ∈ E(Γ, tv, w) for every
x-variant w of v. It then follows from condition vi for evidence functions that
(∀x)ϕ(x) ∈ E(Γ, (tv ∀ x), v) or equivalently, since the occurrence of x in (t ∀ x)
is bound, (∀x)ϕ(x) ∈ E(Γ, (t ∀ x)v, v). Since M,Γ v (t ∀ x):(∀x)ϕ(x), and
we know that (∀x)ϕ(x) ∈ E(Γ, (t ∀ x)v, v), there must be some ∆ ∈ G with
ΓR∆, such that M,∆ v (∀x)ϕ(x). But then, M,∆ w ϕ(x) for some x-
variant w of v. However, it follows from the fact that M,Γ w t:ϕ(x) that
M,∆ w ϕ(x), and this is a contradiction. 
Axiom viii has an interesting consequence: if x does not occur free in t,
and y is new:
(∀x)t:ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃y)y:(∀x)t:ϕ(x) (1)
If we use X to stand for (∃y)y:X, this can be written more perspicuously as
follows.
(∀x)t:ϕ(x) ⊃ (∀x)t:ϕ(x) (2)
Informally, these say that if t provides a uniform proof of every instance of
ϕ(x), that fact is itself provable.
I believe (1), or (2), is weaker than axiom viii, but I do not have a proof of
this. The Barcan formula itself, familiar to modal logic fans, is the following
(∀x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∀x)ϕ(x) (3)
Using the idea that  is an existential quantiﬁer, this can be stated in the
language of QLP as the following, where y is a new variable.
(∀x)(∃y)y:ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃y)y:(∀x)ϕ(x) (4)
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Axiom viii itself can be looked at as a Skolemization of the following.
(∃y)(∀x)y:ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃y)y:(∀x)ϕ(x) (5)
where y does not occur free in ϕ(x). This is easily seen to be implied by
axiom viii, but it is not suﬃcient for proving Proposition 3.1—an explicit
Skolem function is needed.
The diﬀerences and similarities between (4) and (5) are illuminating. In
both cases the consequents are the same: (∀x)ϕ(x) has a proof. But the
antecedents are quite diﬀerent. That of (4) postulates that each instance of
ϕ(x) has a proof, while that of (5) requires that a single justiﬁcation must
serve for each instance—a much stronger condition. It is for this reason that
I used the terminology uniform Barcan formula. Indeed, (4) has much of the
ﬂavor of an omega rule.
I should note that the converse Barcan formula, (∀x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∀x)ϕ(x),
or in QLP language, (∃y)y:(∀x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∀x)(∃y)y:ϕ(x), is simply provable in
QLP.
When working with ﬁrst-order S4, the Barcan formula is what is needed
to show completeness with respect to constant domain models. That proof
carries over to the present setting. If we assume (4) as an axiom in place of
axiom viii, completeness with respect to constant domain QLP models can be
established. Proposition 9.1 shows that axiom viii is valid in constant domain
models, but I do not believe axiom viii is suﬃcient to show completeness with
respect to constant domain models. I do not have a proof of this.
10 Conclusion
There is much work to be done. Several problems were left open in Sec-
tion 9. Does axiom viii correspond to some natural structural condition on
quasi-models? Is the analog of the Barcan formula (4) strictly stronger than
axiom viii? Is (1) strictly weaker than axiom viii? For that matter, is there
some cut-free Gentzen system or tableau system for QLP?
In [3] LP was combined with a conventional multi-agent logic of knowledge.
Suppose we do this with QLP. Then we could distinguish between agent i
knowing X has a reason Ki(∃x)x : X and agent i having a reason for X,
(∃x)Kix:X, or even Kit:X. Or we could say of two agents, that i has a reason
for X, and j knows this, without having to say that j knows what the reason
is, (∃x)Kix:X ∧ Kj(∃x)Kix:X. More could be said, but without a properly
developed semantics, it is not really clear that these have the meanings we
want. This must be left to future work.
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